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Dollars	or	Pence?	Choosing	a	framework	for	US-
China	trade
In	his	recent	Wilson	Center	speech,	Vice-President	Pence	argued	that	US	trade	policy	towards	China	must	now	be
built	upon	the	premise	that	China	is	a	“strategic	and	economic	rival”.	This	change	in	perspective	has	naturally	led
the	US	to	rethink	its	current	trade	policy	with	China,	and	this	rethinking	has	in	turn	put	the	US	and	China	on	their
current	path	towards	a	trade	war	and	economic	decoupling.	At	this	crucial	juncture,	an	exceptionally	distinguished
group	of	Western	and	Chinese	academics	formed	the	US-China	Trade	Policy	Working	Group	(TPWG)	to	devise	a
policy	framework	that	would	prevent	this	trade	war.	Yet,	the	TPWG	framework	accomplishes	this	goal	only	by	taking
a	narrowly	economic	focus	that	banishes	the	strategic	perspective	that	makes	the	trade	war	necessary	from	the
discussion.	So,	while	conceiving	of	US-China	trade	policy	as	the	TPWG	suggests	would	certainly	advance	China’s
strategic	ambitions,	doing	so	would	be	a	disaster	for	the	US.	It	follows	that	the	Trump	administration’s	framework	for
US-China	trade	is	by	far	the	better	choice.
The	TPWG	—	led	by	Dani	Rodrik	(Harvard),	Jeffrey	Lehman	(NYU	Shanghai),	and	Yang	Yao	(Peking	University),
and	including	senior	Chinese	academics	Jiandong	Ju	(Tsinghua	University)	and	Justin	Yifi	Lin	(Peking	University,
former	chief	economist	at	the	World	Bank)	—	starts	from	the	premise	that	the	objective	of	a	country’s	trade	policy	is
to	maximise	the	economic	benefits	it	obtains	from	its	trading	relationships	subject	to	domestic	political	and	social
constraints	(adding	the	constraints	is	what	distinguishes	the	TPWG	framework	from	the	traditional	free	trade
position).	And,	to	be	fair,	this	framework	does	indeed	provide	a	useful	way	of	thinking	about	how	the	US	should
approach	trade	with,	for	example,	Canada	or	a	post-Brexit	UK.	As	a	framework	for	a	trading	relationship	with	a
hostile	strategic	and	economic	rival,	however,	it	suffers	from	two	fundamental	flaws.
First,	under	the	narrow	“own	economic	benefit”	TPWG	framework,	the	US	will	not	be	thinking	about	how	its	trade
policy	affects	the	US-China	balance	of	power	(that	is,	about	the	relative	benefit	that	each	party	obtains	from	the
trading	relationship).	Again,	ignoring	balance	of	power	considerations	makes	sense	with	a	country	such	as	Canada
because	Canada	is	not	striving	to	put	itself	into	a	position	to	avenge	the	loss	of	the	Ohio	territory	in	the	French	and
Indian	War.	China	is	not	like	Canada.	China	is	deliberating	amassing	power	to	enable	it	to	act	against	US	interests
in	Asia	and	globally.	Any	rational	US	trade	policy	towards	China	must	be	designed	with	this	fact	at	its	core	(as	Earl
Thompson’s	pioneering	work	on	national	defense	and	policy	would	suggest).
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Second,	the	TPWG	framework	seeks	to	defuse	the	issues	that	are	now	collectively	leading	to	a	trade	war	by
disaggregating	them.	So,	under	the	TPWG	framework,	the	US	and	China	would:	i)	treat	each	economic	issue
individually;	ii)	delink	economic	and	non-economic	issues;	and	iii)	deal	with	issues	that	affect	both	the	US	and	its
allies	either	as	series	of	separate	bilateral	negotiations	or	on	a	multilateral	basis	that	reflects	international	norms.
Under	this	approach,	the	US	would	be	so	involved	in	arguing	over	a	myriad	of	individual	trees	that	it	would	lack	the
bandwidth	to	even	conceive	of	the	forest,	let	alone	devise	an	appropriate	response.	To	deal	effectively	with	China
as	a	strategic	rival,	the	US	must	look	at	its	trade	policy	as	a	unified	whole	rather	than	as	an	ad	hoc	collection	of
separate	and	independent	issues.
To	illustrate	just	how	dangerous	the	TPWG	framework	would	be	for	the	US,	consider	how	it	would	deal	with
arguably	the	most	important	trade	issue	now	before	the	US	and	China:	Huawei’s	drive	to	install	core	elements	in
the	new	5G	networks	of	key	US	allies	and	a	number	of	other	countries.	There	is	now	an	enormous	amount	of
evidence	suggesting	that	Huawei	is	effectively	an	arm	of	the	Chinese	state	(see,	for	example,	here,		here,	and
here)	rather	than	a	private	company	that	just	happens	to	be	Chinese	(there	is	a	debate	about	Huawei’s	exact
corporate	structure	and	the	extent	of	its	links	to	the	Chinese	government,	but,	in	my	opinion,	this	debate	is	a	bit
beside	the	point	as	I	do	not	see	how	there	can	be	such	a	thing	as	a	private	company	in	a	country	where	the
government	can	harvest	your	organs	if	you	piss	it	off).	If	Huawei	is	effectively	an	arm	of	the	Chinese	state,	then	any
country	that	allows	Huawei	to	install	core	elements	of	its	5G	network	will	sacrifice	network	security	and	will	thereby
provide	China	with	a	significant	strategic	advantage.	So,	assuming	that	Huawei	does	pose	a	threat	to	network
security,	how	should	the	US	deal	with	it?
Under	any	rational	trade	policy,	the	US	would	coordinate	a	joint	response	with	its	allies	and	other	affected	countries
to	the	collective	security	threat	that	Huawei	poses.	Yet,	according	TPWG	member	Jiandong	Ju,	under	the	TPWG
framework	“bilateral	confrontation	policies	would	not	expand	to	the	rest	of	the	world…big	countries,	like	the	US	and
China	[would]	limit	their	confrontational	actions	to	bilateral	and	not	expand	to	multilateral	confrontations”.	TGWG
member	Justin	Yifu	Lin	takes	basically	the	same	position,	arguing	that	“A	developed	country	may	suppress…
leading	industries	in	a	developing	country	[to	maintain]	its	vested	status	and	interests	in	the	name	of	national
security.	This	kind	of	behaviour	is	essentially	a	bullying	behaviour	and	should	be	condemned	and	prohibited”.	In
short,	the	TPWG	framework	makes	it	far	more	difficult	for	the	US	to	devise	an	effective	response	to	Huawei	and
other	such	issues.
So,	the	TPWG	framework	would	put	the	US	into	a	position	in	which	it	is	simply	incapable	of	formulating	a
strategically	coherent	trade	policy	for	China.	One	can	see	why	the	Chinese	are	delighted	to	have	these	ideas	in
play	(and	the	tale	of	how	this	came	to	pass	would	surely	make	for	a	great	novel	by	a	future	Alan	Furst),	but	it	would
be	absolute	lunacy	for	the	US	to	sign	up	to	them.	The	Trump	Administration’s	position	provides	a	far	more	sensible
framework	for	US-China	trade.
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